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Canadian War Museum
1 Vimy Place
Ottawa, ON, K1R 1C2
The Canadian War Museum, the national military history 
museum, is a living memorial 
to those men and women who 
served in Canada’s armed forces. 
It is also a centre for research and 
dissemination of infor-mation 
and expertise on all aspects 
of the country’s military past 
from pre-contact era to the 
present. It preserves the artifacts 
of Canadian military experience, 
interprets them for present 
and future generations, and 
advances the professional 
study of Canadian military 
history, including the effects 
of war and conflict on the 
nation and all its citizens.
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3From the Editor-in-Chief
 Roger Sarty
 Editor-in-Chief
 November 2007
The editors of Canadian Military History wish to 
thank the following people and organizations for their 
contributions to this issue:
Maggie Arbour-Doucette, Brandey Barton, Mark 
Humphries, Kellen Kurschinski, Lianne Leddy, Christine 
Leppard, Vanessa McMackin, Susan Ross, Matt Symes, 
Andrew Thomson, Jane Whalen.
Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre; Canadian War 
Museum; Directorate of History & Heritage, Department 
of National Defence; Security and Defence Forum, 
Department of National Defence; Library and  Archives 
Canada; Wilfrid Laurier University.
Marc Milner of the University of New Brunswick, although best known for his 
work on the navy, has for many years also been a 
leader in battlefield study tours, particularly the 
Canadian battlefields in Europe. His many treks 
through Normandy, stimulated by the questions 
and insights of generations of young and not-so-
young students, inspired his current research on 
the role of the Royal Canadian Artillery. Marc was 
also prompted to write this article as his father 
served in 13th Field Regiment during these early 
bridgehead battles. The “Guns of Bretteville” is 
a substantial addition to our knowledge of this 
period of the Normandy campaign.
 Andrew Iarocci provides another view of the 
Royal Canadian Artillery in Northwest Europe 
with a paper on the Canadian designed and 
produced Sexton self-propelled gun and its 
employment by the 23rd Field Regiment. Andrew 
recently joined the Canadian War Museum history 
team on a fellowship to carry out research on 
vehicles in the museum’s collection; the present 
article grew directly from this assignment.
 Continuing with the theme of self-propelled 
artillery is an account by Wesley M. Alkenbrack, a 
D-Day veteran of 14th Field Regiment, who writes 
of the destruction three SP guns of his unit on 6 
June.
 Laura Brandon, the art historian at the 
museum, has continued her important, if sad, 
mission, of noting the passing of each artist of 
the Canadian forces’ official art program of the 
Second World War. Patrick G. Cowley-Brown 
recorded the far-flung home stations of the Royal 
Canadian Air Force. Aside from capturing the 
vast but often little-known home operations of 
the air force, he also vividly portrayed dramatic 
landscapes at the very fringes of the country.
 Part of the journal’s present mission is to 
strengthen coverage of early Canadian military 
history and of current missions and issues as 
well. John Grodzinski of the Royal Military 
College of Canada questions the British Army’s 
reputation for savage discipline during the era of 
the War of 1812, while showing that the ostensibly 
more democratic and humane US Army of that 
same period more readily inflicted the death 
penalty on its members. 
 Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, both members 
of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, have 
collaborated to produce a strongly argued piece 
on the historical context of their current work at 
the institute. Tony Balasevicius and Greg Smith, 
both serving infantry officers in the Canadian 
Forces (CF), have also thought deeply about the 
background to current challenges facing the CF, 
in this case lessons that can be learned from the 
experiences of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan 
in the 1980s.
 An addition to this issue of CMH is the 
introduction of a column on web resources. Ken 
Reynolds, an historian with the Department of 
National Defence, writes about the Commonwealth 
War Graves Commission website. Ken will 
contribute future columns about websites of 
relevance to the readers of CMH.
 This issue marks an important landmark. It 
is the last for which Cameron Pulsifer will serve 
as the CWM editor. He took up that role with our 
very first issue in 1992. Cam, as I have recently 
remarked on this page, has been a leader in the 
development of professional research standards 
for the museum’s collections and has brought 
that leadership in material history to our pages. 
Cam has now retired from the museum after a 
career of some 30 years at Queen’s University, 
Parks Canada, and the Canadian Museum of 
Civilization as well as CWM. We, of course, 
look forward to the future contributions Cam 
can make now that he has joined the leisured 
classes.
contents - Autumn 2007.indd   3 06/11/2007   11:32:25 AM
3
et al.: Table of Contents
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2007
4Dear sir,
There is a tendency in the Canadian military 
history tradition - witnessed 
particularly in transcribers of 
regimental histories – to zero-
in on low-level Canadian army 
attacks where casualties were 
high or the objective was not 
gained. “Slaughter” is a term 
often used by writers capturing 
the concerns of the veterans 
as to why an attack was not 
stopped. While understandable 
in the micro-world for which 
reg imenta l  h is tor ies  are 
recorded, in the macro-world 
of global conflict, this is naive 
at best. When former company, 
battalion, brigade or divisional 
commanders are asked “Why?” 
the answer is often recorded as 
“I had my orders” or “One has 
to obey orders.” Years after the 
events, the reader or listener 
is left with the impression that 
these commanders were simply 
“automatons” blindly following 
orders (this was after all the Nazi 
excuse). But is this the case? Or 
is it simply that the listener/
reader does not comprehend 
what was meant? The former 
commander being interviewed 
either believes the regimental 
historian understands what he 
is saying, or that the radio/TV 
interviewer does not - never 
will - and there is no way that 
he is going to be able to explain 
“it” to this person, particularly 
years after the fact! Hence 
the response: “Well, I had my 
orders!” 
 Shades of this come across 
in “Trial by Fire” where Chris 
Case examines the leadership 
of Major-General Chris Vokes. 
Other writers have wondered 
why Vokes did not call a halt 
to the attacks around Ortona 
and Mr. Case does a good job 
of explaining this. On the other 
hand, in a Canadian context, it 
is often asked: “Why did Major-
General Roberts halt his 11th 
(BR) Armoured Division in 
Antwerpen on September 4th, 
1944?” Had he carried on to 
Breda a great many Canadian 
lives would have been spared 
in late 1944 fighting to clear 
the Scheldt and open the port. 
Perhaps he too had his orders, 
and had gone as far as he 
could. 
 What does a commander 
really mean by: “I had my orders!” 
At any level - be it section, 
platoon, company, battalion, 
brigade, division, corps or 
army - a commander will know 
the objectives of all his “peer” 
commanders, is fully conscious 
of his immediate superiors 
“plan” (into which his part fits), 
and will have an understanding 
of how the higher level plan is 
expected to unfold. That the 
average “infanteer” (recorded 
in regimental histories) does 
not know this should come 
as no surprise – a soldier’s 
view is a very narrow one in 
terms of both time and space. 
Particularly at the Captain and 
higher level, a commander will 
have the opportunity to ask if 
something that bothers him 
has been considered or taken 
account of. He may even be able 
to offer an alternative approach 
to achieve his assigned task, but 
he implicitly understands that 
he can’t change his objective, 
because “his objective” is only a 
small part of a larger objective. 
He also fully understands the 
consequences of his men not 
carrying out their task according 
to the plan - by not achieving 
their objective, others will die! 
Additionally, he appreciates 
that the staff have devoted 
their time, and have used their 
expertise and experience to 
ensure the plan is feasible well 
before the “Orders” are issued. 
Nevertheless, no plan is ever 
perfect! And things rarely, if 
ever, unfold according to plan 
for the reasons explained in the 
article. 
 Nevertheless, once the final 
decision is made and the “Order” 
given, a subordinate commander 
is faced with one of two options: 
carry out the Order, or refuse 
and suffer the consequences 
- one of which is that someone 
else will lead your men into 
battle (and probably get them 
killed). Because the mission 
will go ahead, due to the simple 
fact that it is a small part of 
something bigger - particularly 
in a Canadian context usually 
much bigger! Few, if any, writers 
or interviewers convey this “fact” 
of military operations, and 
military historians perhaps tend 
to take this understanding for 
continued on page 72…
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